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Barriers to international trade are known to be large. But have they become
smaller over time? Building on the gravity framework by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), I derive an analytical solution for time-varying multilateral
resistance variables that can be related to observable trade data. This solution
makes it possible to infer time-varying bilateral trade costs directly from the
model￿ s gravity equation without imposing arbitrary trade cost functions. As an
illustration, I show that U.S. trade costs with major trading partners declined on
average by about 40 percent between 1970 and 2000, with Mexico and Canada
experiencing the biggest reductions.
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Barriers to international trade are large and they consist of a variety of components. These
include transportation costs and tari⁄s but also components that are rather di¢ cult to ob-
serve such as language barriers, informational costs and bureaucratic red tape. These trade
costs impede international trade ￿ ows and it is therefore important to measure them. It
would be desirable to collect direct data on each component and then add up the individual
components to obtain a summary measure of trade costs. But in practice this approach is
hardly feasible because of data limitations. In this paper I propose an alternative way of
measuring trade costs.
Instead of collecting direct data on trade costs I develop a methodology that infers
trade costs indirectly from trade data. This methodology is easy to implement and yields
a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs at the country pair level that varies over
time. I obtain this trade cost measure based on the gravity equation framework developed
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Gravity equations are the workhorse model of
international trade and have been used by economists for many decades to relate bilateral
trade ￿ ows to bilateral trade cost proxies such as distance. They can be derived from a
large number of theoretical models and have one of the strongest empirical track records in
economics (see Evenett and Keller, 2002). But in their highly in￿ uential paper, Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) demonstrate that it is not only bilateral trade barriers but also
multilateral trade barriers that determine the trade ￿ ows between two countries. This
crucial insight about multilateral trade barriers is the motivation for deriving the trade
cost measure from the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework.
To illustrate the importance of multilateral trade barriers, consider the example of trade
between the U.S. and Canada. U.S.-Canadian trade is not only in￿ uenced by their bilateral
barrier but also by their trade barriers with other countries. To see this point, suppose
that U.S. trade barriers go down with all countries in the world except for Canada (that
is, the U.S. multilateral trade barrier goes down). In that case some U.S. trade will be
diverted away from Canada towards other countries although the bilateral U.S.-Canadian
trade barrier itself has not changed. My trade cost measure is able to separate the bilateral
barrier from these multilateral e⁄ects.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, building on the gravity model by An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003) I derive an analytical solution for time-varying multilateral
trade barriers, or multilateral resistance variables. This solution is useful because it relates
the unobservable multilateral trade barriers to observable trade data. In particular, I show
that multilateral resistance is a function of how much a country trades with itself, that
is, intranational trade ￿ ows. Intuitively, the more a country trades with itself, the higher
1must be the trade barriers it faces on international markets. Multilateral trade barriers
have been acknowledged for some time, for example by Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand
(1985). But so far it has been either impossible or very cumbersome to solve for them. I
overcome this problem by relating them to observable data.
Second, with the solution for multilateral resistance variables at hand, I am able to
analytically solve the model￿ s gravity equation for the micro-founded bilateral trade cost
measure. Since this trade cost measure is a function of observable trade data, it can be
easily implemented with time series and panel data to track the changes of trade costs over
time. This approach substantially facilitates the inference of time-varying trade costs from
trade data. It generalizes the approach of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who only
consider cross-sectional data.
As trade costs are a function of observable trade data, I do not need to assume any
particular trade cost function. In contrast, every gravity regression implicitly assumes such
a trade cost function by focusing on certain trade cost proxies such as geographical distance
as explanatory variables. Moreover, the trade cost measure does not impose bilateral trade
cost symmetry. It represents an average of bilateral trade barriers in both directions and
it is therefore consistent with asymmetric trade costs.
The trade cost measure captures a wide range of trade cost components including those
that are not typically considered in standard gravity regressions. For example, the measure
can capture informational trade costs as identi￿ed by Portes and Rey (2005) as well as
hidden transaction costs due to poor security highlighted by Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002). It is therefore a comprehensive measure of trade costs that re￿ ects a great variety
of trade frictions. It can be interpreted as a ￿ gravity residual￿that compares actual trade
￿ ows to those predicted in the absence of all trade frictions. In that sense its nature is
related to the literature on missing trade that juxtaposes actual and predicted trade ￿ ows
(see Tre￿ er, 1995).
As an illustration I compute U.S. bilateral trade costs with a number of major trad-
ing partners. Over the period 1970-2000 U.S. trade costs declined by about 40 percent,
consistent with improvements in transportation and communication technology and the
formation of free trade agreements such at NAFTA. The level of trade costs in 2000, ex-
pressed as a tari⁄ equivalent, is lowest with Canada at 25 percent, followed by Mexico at
33 percent. These levels are in the same overall range as those reported by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) for the year 1993. The innovation of my approach is to produce such
estimates not only for a cross section but also over time. This is possible because trade
costs depend explicitly on observable time-varying trade data as opposed to time-invariant
trade cost proxies.
The third contribution of the paper is to provide a simple analytical framework for
2explaining the growth of trade. I decompose the growth of bilateral trade into three distinct
contributions ￿the growth of income, the decline of bilateral trade barriers and the decline
of multilateral resistance. In an application to U.S. trade data over the period 1970-2000, I
￿nd that income growth explains the majority of U.S. trade growth. The decline of bilateral
trade barriers is the second biggest contribution but this contribution varies considerably
across trading partners. For example, the decline of bilateral trade barriers is about twice
as important for explaining the growth of trade with Mexico as it is for explaining the
growth of trade with Japan. My results are consistent with those of Baier and Bergstrand
(2001) who argue that two-thirds of the growth in trade amongst OECD countries between
1958 and 1988 can be explained by the growth of income. But the innovation of my
decomposition is to explicitly account for the role of multilateral resistance.
The Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity framework has attracted a lot of atten-
tion in the literature. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show that in gravity applications the
nonlinear multilateral resistance terms can be approximated by a log-linear Taylor-series
expansion. Instead of an approximation my approach yields an analytical solution for the
multilateral resistance terms that is easy to implement. Balistreri and Hillberry (2007)
argue that Anderson and van Wincoop￿ s (2003) solution of the border puzzle critically
hinges on the assumption of bilateral trade cost symmetry. In contrast, I do not constrain
bilateral trade costs to be symmetric and focus on the average of bilateral trade barriers in
both directions. This approach is consistent with underlying trade cost asymmetries.
The trade cost measure that I derive on the basis of the Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) framework is related to the ￿ freeness of trade￿measure in the New Economic Geog-
raphy literature. The freeness measure captures the inverse of trade costs so that a high
value corresponds to low trade barriers (see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Head
and Ries, 2001; Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2003; Head and
Mayer, 2004). My paper points out that there is a direct link between this literature and
the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity framework. In particular, I focus on the
role of multilateral resistance and show how it can be related to observable data.
Finally, several authors present direct measures of trade costs (see Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2004, for a survey). Limªo and Venables (2001) employ data on the cost of
shipping a standard 40-foot container from Baltimore, Maryland, to various destinations in
the world, showing that transport costs are signi￿cantly increased by poor infrastructure
and adverse geographic features such as being landlocked. Hummels (2007) examines the
costs of ocean shipping and air transportation. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) propose
a trade restrictiveness index that is based on observable tari⁄and non-tari⁄barriers. They
show that tari⁄s alone are a poor indicator of trade restrictiveness as non-tari⁄ barriers
also provide a considerable degree of trade protection. I view such direct measures of trade
3costs as complements to indirect trade cost measures that are inferred from trade ￿ ows.
Direct measures have the advantage of being more precise on the particular trade cost
components that they capture. But their use is often restricted by data limitations and by
the fact that many trade cost components are unobservable.
The paper is organized as follows. Building on the model by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) I show in Section 2 how to derive an analytical solution for multilateral resistance
variables as a function of observable data. I also show how this solution can be used to solve
the model￿ s gravity equation for the micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs. As an
illustration I present U.S. bilateral trade costs for a number of major trading partners. In
Section 3 I decompose the growth of bilateral trade into the growth of income and changes
in trade costs. Section 4 demonstrates why estimates of changes in trade barriers over
time are generally biased if multilateral resistance is misspeci￿ed as a constant. Section 5
provides a brief discussion of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 International Trade with Trade Costs
2.1 The Anderson and van Wincoop Gravity Model
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) develop a multi-country general equilibrium model of
international trade. Each country is endowed with a single good that is di⁄erentiated from
those produced by other countries. Optimizing individual consumers enjoy consuming a
large variety of domestic and foreign goods. Their preferences are assumed to be identical
across countries and are captured by constant elasticity of substitution utility.
As the key element in their model, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduce ex-
ogenous bilateral trade costs. When a good is shipped from country i to j, bilateral
variable transportation costs and other variable trade barriers drive up the cost of each
unit shipped.1 As a result of trade costs, goods prices di⁄er across countries. Speci￿cally,
if pi is the net supply price of the good originating in country i, then pij = pitij is the price
of this good faced by consumers in country j, where tij ￿ 1 is the gross bilateral trade cost
factor (one plus the tari⁄ equivalent).
Based on this framework Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a micro-founded









1Modeling trade costs in this way is well established in the literature. It is consistent with the iceberg
formulation of trade costs that portrays trade costs as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean and
partly melted in transit (e.g., Samuelson, 1954, and Krugman, 1980).
4xij denotes nominal exports from i to j, yi is nominal income of country i and yW is world
income de￿ned as yW ￿
P
j yj. ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods. ￿i and
Pj are country i￿ s and country j￿ s price indices.
The gravity equation implies that all else being equal, bigger countries trade more with
each other. Bilateral trade costs tij decrease bilateral trade but they have to be measured
against the price indices ￿i and Pj.2 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call these price
indices multilateral resistance variables because they include trade costs with all other






















where ￿j is the world income share of country j de￿ned as ￿j ￿ yj=yW. ￿i is the outward
multilateral resistance variable as it includes bilateral trade costs tij summed over and
weighted by all destination countries j, whereas Pj is the inward multilateral resistance
variable as it includes bilateral trade costs tij summed over and weighted by all origin
countries i. Thus, an important insight from gravity equation (1) is that bilateral trade
￿ ows do not only depend on the bilateral trade barrier but also on the multilateral trade
barriers of the two countries involved. What matters is the relative trade barrier.
2.2 The Link between Multilateral Resistance and Intranational
Trade
It has been a problem in the literature to ￿nd appropriate expressions for the multilateral
resistance variables in equations (2) and (3). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point
out that in general ￿i and Pj should not be interpreted as consumer price indices. For
example, a home bias in preferences would yield the same gravity equation as (1) and the
same expressions for ￿i and Pj as in equations (2) and (3). But then ￿i and Pj would
include the nonpecuniary home bias and could therefore no longer be regarded as consumer
price indices.
Instead, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) assume that bilateral trade costs are a
function of two particular trade cost proxies ￿a border barrier and geographical distance.
In particular, they assume the trade cost function tij = bijd
￿
ij where bij is a border-related
indicator variable, dij is bilateral distance and ￿ is the distance elasticity. In addition, they
2To obtain this result Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) adopt a useful normalization.
5simplify the model by assuming that bilateral trade costs are symmetric (i.e., tij = tji).
Under the symmetry assumption it follows that outward and inward multilateral resistance
are the same (i.e., ￿i = Pi). Thus, conditioning on these additional assumptions, Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) ￿nd an implicit solution for multilateral resistance based on (2)
and (3).
But there are a number of drawbacks associated with the additional assumptions.3 First,
the chosen trade cost function might be misspeci￿ed. Its functional form might be incorrect
and it might omit important trade cost determinants such as tari⁄s. Second, bilateral trade
costs might be asymmetric, for example if one country imposes higher tari⁄s than the other.
Third, in practice trade barriers are time-varying, for example when countries phase out
tari⁄s. Time-invariant trade cost proxies such as distance are therefore hardly useful in
capturing trade cost changes over time.
In what follows, I propose a method that helps to overcome these drawbacks by deriving
an analytical solution for multilateral resistance variables. This method does not rely on
any particular trade cost function and it does not impose trade cost symmetry. Instead,
trade costs are inferred from time-varying trade data that are readily observable.
Intuitively, my method makes use of the insight that a change in bilateral trade barriers
does not only a⁄ect international trade but also intranational trade. For example, suppose
that country i￿ s trade barriers with all other countries increase. In that case, some of
the goods that i used to ship to foreign countries are now consumed domestically, i.e.,
intranationally. It is therefore not only the extent of international trade that depends on
trade barriers with the rest of the world but also the extent of intranational trade.
This can be seen formally by using gravity equation (1) to ￿nd an expression for country









where tii represents intranational trade costs, for example domestic transportation costs.









As an example suppose two countries i and j face the same domestic trade costs tii = tjj
and are of the same size yi = yj but country i is a more closed economy, that is, xii > xjj. It
follows directly from (5) that multilateral resistance is higher for country i (￿iPi > ￿jPj).
Equation (5) implies that for given tii it is easy to measure the change in multilateral
resistance over time as it does not depend on time-invariant trade cost proxies such as
3Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 180) provide a brief discussion on this point.
6distance.
Multilateral resistance can also be thought of in terms of trade diversion and trade
creation. For given output yi and yW and given domestic trade costs tii, trade diversion
from one bilateral trading partner to another does not a⁄ect domestic trade xii and therefore
neither multilateral resistance. However, trade creation implies a drop in domestic trade
and therefore a drop in multilateral resistance.
2.3 A Micro-Founded Measure of Trade Costs
The explicit solution for the multilateral resistance variables can be exploited to solve
the general equilibrium model for bilateral trade costs. Gravity equation (1) contains the
product of outward multilateral resistance of one country and inward multilateral resistance
of another country, ￿iPj, whereas equation (5) provides a solution for ￿iPi. It is therefore
useful to multiply gravity equation (1) by the corresponding gravity equation for trade
￿ ows in the opposite direction, xji, to obtain a bidirectional gravity equation that contains

















The size variable in gravity equation (7) is not total income yiyj as in traditional gravity
equations but intranational trade xiixjj. Intranational trade does not only control for
the countries￿economic size, but according to equation (5) it is also directly linked to










As shipping costs between i and j can be asymmetric (tij 6= tji) and as domestic trade
costs can di⁄er across countries (tii 6= tjj), it is useful to take the geometric mean of the
barriers in both directions. It is also useful to deduct one to get an expression for the tari⁄














7￿ij measures bilateral trade costs tijtji relative to domestic trade costs tiitjj. It therefore
does not impose frictionless domestic trade and captures what makes international trade
more costly over and above domestic trade.4
The intuition behind ￿ij is straightforward. If bilateral trade ￿ ows xijxji increase relative
to domestic trade ￿ ows xiixjj, it must have become easier for the two countries to trade with
each other. This is captured by a decrease in ￿ij, and vice versa. The measure thus captures
trade costs in an indirect way by inferring them from observable trade ￿ ows. Since these
trade ￿ ows vary over time, trade costs ￿ij can be computed not only for cross-sectional data
but also for time series and panel data. This is an advantage over the procedure adopted
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who only use cross-sectional data.
It is important to stress that the trade cost measure ￿ij is consistent with trade cost
asymmetries. ￿ij indicates the geometric average of the bilateral trade barriers in both
directions. The underlying barriers might be asymmetric (tij 6= tji) and the bilateral trade
￿ ows might be unbalanced (xij 6= xji), but it is not possible to infer the extent of the
asymmetry from ￿ij.
2.4 Illustration: U.S. Trade Costs
As an illustration of the trade cost measure ￿ij derived in equation (9), I compute U.S.
bilateral trade costs for a number of major trading partners. I focus on how these bilateral
trade costs have evolved over time using annual data for 1970-2000.
All bilateral trade data are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)
and denominated in U.S. dollars. Data for intranational trade xii are not directly available
but can be constructed following the approach by Shang-Jin Wei (1996). Due to market
clearing intranational trade can be expressed as total income minus total exports, xii =
yi ￿ xi, where total exports xi are de￿ned as the sum of all exports from country i, xi ￿
P
j6=i xij.5 However, GDP data are not suitable as income yi because they are based on
value added, whereas the trade data are reported as gross shipments. Moreover, GDP
data include services that are not covered by the trade data.6 To get the gross shipment
counterpart of GDP excluding services I follow Wei (1996) in constructing yi as total goods
4￿ij can also be interpreted as a measure of the international component of trade costs net of distribution
trade costs in the destination country. Formally, suppose total gross shipping costs tij can be decomposed
into gross shipping costs up to the border of j, denoted by t￿
ij, times the gross shipping costs within j,
denoted by tjj, where tjj is the same for all origins of shipment. It follows tij = t￿







5See equation (8) in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
6Anderson (1979) acknowledges nontradable services and models the spending on tradables as ￿yi,
where ￿ is the fraction of total income spent on tradables. But ￿yi would still be based on value added.
























































Figure 1: U.S. bilateral trade costs with Canada and Mexico.
production based on the OECD￿ s Structural Analysis (STAN) database.7 The production
data are converted into U.S. dollars by the period average exchange rate taken from the
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). In order to remain as close to existing trade
cost measures as possible, I follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in setting ￿ = 8 for
the elasticity of substitution. I discuss in Section 5 that the inferred change of trade costs
over time is very similar for alternative values of ￿.
Figure 1 illustrates U.S. bilateral trade costs with its two biggest trading partners,
Canada and Mexico. U.S. trade costs fell dramatically with Mexico (from 96 to 33 percent)
and also with Canada (from 50 to 25 percent). The U.S. experienced a clear downward
trend in trade costs with both its neighbors already prior to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA, e⁄ective from 1994), the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
(CUSFTA, e⁄ective from 1989) and unilateral Mexican trade liberalization (from 1985).8
It is important to stress that these numbers represent bilateral relative to domestic
trade costs. For example, take the result that U.S.-Canadian trade costs are 25 percent
in the year 2000. Suppose that a particular good produced in either the U.S. or Canada
costs $10.00 at the factory gate. Also suppose that domestic wholesale and retail distribu-
tion costs are 55 percent (tii=1.55), which is the representative domestic distribution cost
across OECD countries as reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). A domestic
7Wei (1996) uses production data for agriculture, mining and total manufacturing. Also see Nitsch
(2000).
8As pointed out earlier, ￿ij is related to the ￿ freeness of trade￿measure in the New Economic Geography
literature, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). For a plot of the inverse freeness measure in a two-
country model, see Figure 2 in Head and Ries (2001).
9Table 1: U.S. Bilateral Trade Costs
Tari⁄ equivalent ￿ in %
Partner country 1970 2000 Percentage change
canada 50 25 ￿50
germany 95 70 ￿26
japan 85 65 ￿24
korea 107 70 ￿35
mexico 96 33 ￿66
uk 95 63 ￿34
Plain average 88 54 ￿38
Trade-weighted average 74 42 ￿44
All numbers are in percent and rounded o⁄ to integers.
Countries listed are the six biggest U.S. export markets as of 2000.
Computations based on equation (9).
consumer could therefore buy the product for $15.50, whereas a consumer abroad would
have to pay $19.40 (tij=1.94=1.55￿1.25). This example illustrates that the absolute domes-
tic trade costs ($5.50=$15.50-$10.00) can be substantially bigger than the absolute cost of
crossing the border ($3.90=$19.40-$15.50). Of course, this particular example is based on
an aggregate average and should be interpreted as such. In practice, trade costs can vary
considerably across goods. For instance, perishable goods are more likely to be transported
by air freight instead of less expensive truck or ocean shipping.
Table 1 reports the levels and the percentage decline in U.S. bilateral trade costs between
1970 and 2000 with its six biggest export markets as of 2000. In descending order these
are Canada, Mexico, Japan, the UK, Germany and Korea.9 The decline has been most
dramatic with Mexico and Canada and has been sizeable with Korea, the UK, Germany
and Japan. The trade-weighted average of U.S. trade costs declined by 44 percent between
1970 and 2000, corresponding to an annualized decline of 1:9 percent per year.10 Its 2000
level stands at 42 percent.
It is important to take into consideration that the trade cost measure ￿ij does not
only capture trade costs in the narrow sense of transportation costs and tari⁄s. ￿ij also
comprises trade cost components such as language barriers and currency barriers. In their
survey on trade costs, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) show that such non-tari⁄barriers
are substantial.
The magnitudes of the bilateral trade costs in Table 1 are entirely consistent with cross-
sectional evidence from the previous literature. But the main advantage of ￿ij over previous
9These six countries are those for which the 2000 share of U.S. exports exceeded 3 percent. Between
1970 and 2000 their combined share of U.S. exports ￿ uctuated between 43 and 58 percent.
10x = ￿0:019 is the solution to 42 = 74￿(1 + x)30.
10trade cost measures is that ￿ij can be easily tracked over time. For the year 1993 only,
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report a 46 percent tari⁄ equivalent of overall U.S.-
Canadian trade costs, compared to 31 percent in Figure 1.11 The reason why the number
reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) is somewhat higher is that they use GDP
data as opposed to production data to compute trade costs. In fact, when using GDP data
I obtain U.S.-Canadian trade costs of 47 percent for 1993, almost exactly the 46 percent
value reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).12 But GDP data tend to overstate
the extent of intranational trade and thus the level of trade costs because they include
services.13 I therefore prefer to follow Wei (1996) in using merchandise production data to
match the trade data more accurately.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) report bilateral tari⁄equivalents based on data for 19 OECD
countries in 1990. For countries that are 750-1500 miles apart, an elasticity of substitution
of ￿ = 8 implies a trade cost range of 58-78 percent, consistent with the magnitudes in
Table 1.
In summary, Figure 1 and Table 1 demonstrate that trade costs are large but gener-
ally experienced a substantial decline between 1970 and 2000. They exhibit considerable
heterogeneity across country pairs that would be masked by a one-￿ts-all measure of trade
costs.14
3 Decomposing the Growth of Trade
Bilateral trade has grown strongly for most country pairs in recent years. It is an important
question whether this increase in trade is simply the result of secular economic growth or
whether the increase can be related to reductions in trade frictions.
The micro-founded gravity equation (6) provides a simple analytical framework to de-
scribe the roles of economic growth and trade barrier reductions in determining the growth
11Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) calculate the tari⁄ equivalent as the trade-weighted average barrier
for trade between U.S. states and Canadian provinces relative to the trade-weighted average barrier for
trade within the United States and Canada, using a trade cost function that includes a border-related
dummy variable and distance.
12For ￿ = 5 and ￿ = 10 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, Table 7) report 1993 U.S.-Canadian trade
cost tari⁄ equivalents of 91 and 35 percent, respectively. The corresponding numbers based on (9) are 97
and 35 percent when using GDP data and 61 and 24 percent when using production data. See Section 5
for a discussion of ￿.
13Speci￿cally, intranational trade is given by xii = yi ￿ xi. As GDP data include services and as the
service share of GDP has continually grown, the use of GDP data for yi overstates xii compared to the use
of production data despite the fact that imported intermediate goods are included in the trade data (see
Helliwell, 2005). Novy (2008) develops a trade cost model with nontradable goods, showing that only the
tradable part of output enters the model￿ s micro-founded gravity equation.
14For a comparison of the period 1950-2000 to the period 1870-1913 see Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2008).






+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ln(tijtji) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ln(￿iPi￿jPj) (10)
Equation (10) relates the growth of bilateral trade, ￿ln(xijxji), to three driving forces:
the growth of the two countries￿economies relative to world output, changes in bilat-
eral trade costs, ￿ln(tijtji), and changes in the two countries￿multilateral trade barriers,
￿ln(￿iPi￿jPj). The bilateral trade cost factors tijtji are unknown. But we know from
equation (9) that the trade cost measure ￿ij provides an expression of tijtji relative to
domestic trade costs tiitjj as a function of observable trade ￿ ows. I therefore substitute ￿ij






+ 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ln(1 + ￿ij) ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ln(￿i￿j) (11)








The last term in equation (11) thus represents changes in multilateral resistance relative





















Equation (13) breaks down the growth of bilateral trade into three contributions: (a)
the contribution of income growth, (b) the contribution of the decline in bilateral trade
costs, and (c) the contribution of the decline in multilateral resistance.15 If all trade bar-
riers in the world are constant over time, then contributions (b) and (c) are zero and the
growth of trade is driven entirely by the growth of income. If bilateral trade costs fall
(i.e., ￿ln(1 + ￿ij) < 0), then contribution (b) becomes positive.16 If multilateral trade
15Baier and Bergstrand (2001) further decompose the product of incomes, yiyj, into income shares and
the sum of incomes. De￿ne the bilateral income share as si = yi=(yi + yj). It follows yiyj = sisj(yi + yj)2
and thus ￿ln(yiyj) = ￿ln(sisj)+2￿ln(yi + yj). ￿ln(sisj) could then be interpreted as the contribution
of income convergence. Also see Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Debaere (2005).
However, after controlling for tari⁄ cuts and transport cost reductions Baier and Bergstrand (2001) ￿nd
virtually no e⁄ect of income convergence on trade growth. In any case this ￿ner decomposition would not
a⁄ect the contribution of bilateral trade costs and multilateral resistance in equation (13).
16Note that ￿ > 1. To be precise, a fall in bilateral trade costs also leads to a slight fall in ￿i￿j because















canada 609 65:3 + 42:3 ￿ 7:6 = 100
germany 526 67:1 + 36:4 ￿ 3:5 = 100
japan 580 79:3 + 28:3 ￿ 7:6 = 100
korea 832 92:3 + 33:5 ￿ 25:8 = 100
mexico 944 54:8 + 57:4 ￿ 12:2 = 100
uk 578 55:9 + 43:8 + 0:3 = 100
Growth between 1970 and 2000. All numbers in percent.
Countries listed are the six biggest U.S. export markets as of 2000.
Computations based on equation (13).
barriers fall (i.e., ￿ln(￿i￿j) < 0), then contribution (c) becomes negative. This negative
contribution is a trade diversion e⁄ect. If trade barriers with other countries fall, trade
with those countries increases but bilateral trade between i and j decreases.
The decomposition does not depend on the value of the elasticity of substitution ￿.
Contribution (a) is given by the data. Contribution (b) is also given by the data through
equation (9). Likewise, contribution (c) is given by the solution for multilateral resistance
in equation (5).17
3.1 Illustration: Decomposing the Growth of U.S. Trade
I apply equation (13) to decompose the growth of U.S. bilateral trade. As in Table 1, I
consider the six biggest U.S. export markets as of 2000. Table 2 reports the decomposition
results.
Table 2 shows that for the period 1970 to 2000 the growth of income can explain more
than half of the growth of U.S. bilateral trade. Income growth can explain almost all of
the trade growth with Korea (92:3 percent) but only just over 50 percent with Mexico and
the UK. The decline of bilateral trade costs on average provides the second most important
contribution to the growth of bilateral trade. This contribution is biggest for Mexico (57:4
percent) and smallest for Japan (28:3 percent).
The decline of multilateral trade barriers diverts trade away from the U.S. Take the
multilateral resistance is a weighted average of all bilateral trade costs, see equations (2) and (3). Since
the fall in ￿i￿j works against the e⁄ect of falling bilateral trade costs, contribution (b) slightly overstates
their e⁄ect but is valid as an approximation.
17Equation (9) implies 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ln(1 + ￿ij) = ￿ln(xijxji) ￿ ￿ln(xiixjj). Equation (5) implies












. It follows that the decomposition in equation (13)
is not a⁄ected even if ￿ changes over time.
13example of Korea. Korean trade barriers with other countries dropped considerably over
time so that the diversion e⁄ect is strongly negative for Korea (￿25:8 percent). While the
decline in bilateral trade costs explains about a third in the growth of trade between Korea
and the U.S., the trade-diverting e⁄ect of trade cost declines with other countries partially
o⁄sets the bilateral improvements so that the overall role of trade costs (33:5 ￿ 25:8 = 7:7
percent) is modest compared to other countries in the sample.
The trade diversion e⁄ect is actually slightly positive for the UK (+0:3 percent). The
positive multilateral resistance e⁄ect means that on average multilateral trade barriers for
the UK increased over time, making trade with the U.S. relatively more attractive. This
result is particular to the UK as a major former colonial power since the UK￿ s traditionally
strong trade relationships with former colonies such as Australia and New Zealand became
weaker over time.18
In summary, Table 2 demonstrates that income growth is the biggest driving force
behind the increase in bilateral U.S. trade. This result is consistent with the ￿ndings of
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) who argue that two-thirds of the growth in trade amongst
OECD countries between 1958 and 1988 can be explained by the growth of income.19 But
the innovation of decomposing the growth of trade by equation (13) is to explicitly take
multilateral trade barriers into account. Multilateral trade barriers are important because
in general equilibrium, the trade ￿ ows between any two countries are a⁄ected both by
bilateral and multilateral trade barriers. As Table 2 shows, multilateral trade barriers play
a decisive role in practice and neglecting them would convey a distorted view of the forces
that drive the growth of international trade.20
4 What Happens When Multilateral Resistance is Mis-
speci￿ed as a Constant?
Many empirical applications are concerned with measuring how trade barriers change over
time. For example, Glick and Rose (2002) examine whether joining a currency union im-
proves countries￿trade ￿ ows over time. FontagnØ, Mayer and Zignago (2005) study how
18Novy (2008) shows that the trade-enhancing e⁄ect of a former colonial relationship was strong in 1970
but gradually tapered o⁄ thereafter, becoming insigni￿cant by the year 2000.
19Whalley and Xin (2007) calibrate a general equilibrium model of world trade. For a sample of both
OECD and non-OECD countries they ￿nd that income growth explains 76 percent of the growth of in-
ternational trade between 1975 and 2004. This ￿nding suggests that trade barrier reductions might have
been less important for explaining the trade growth of non-OECD countries.
20Another di⁄erence is that Baier and Bergstrand (2001) only consider tari⁄s and transportation costs,
whereas trade costs in the context of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model are more broadly de￿ned
to include informational, institutional and nontari⁄ barriers to trade.
14border-related barriers evolve over time for the U.S., the EU and Japan. Such applica-
tions are inherently of interest to policymakers who aim at reducing barriers that impede
international trade.
The challenge in such panel data applications is to adequately control for multilateral
resistance terms. In gravity equations they are often proxied by time-invariant ￿xed e⁄ects.
But clearly, if trade barriers change over time, there is reason to believe that multilateral
resistance also changes over time. I now demonstrate why estimates of trade cost changes
over time are generally biased if they ignore that multilateral resistance changes over time.
To see the consequences of misspecifying multilateral resistance as a constant I take the




















The variables in the second pair of parentheses of (14) are frequently ignored or misspeci￿ed
in standard gravity equations, that is, multilateral resistance and domestic trade costs are














I can therefore compute ￿i directly from the data without imposing a trade cost function
that includes distance or other trade cost proxies.







￿i￿j ￿ 1 (16)







b ￿ib ￿j ￿ 1 (17)
where b ￿ij denotes the biased trade cost measure and b ￿i and b ￿j denote the misspeci￿ed
multilateral resistance terms. By rearranging equations (16) and (17), taking logarithms
15and ￿rst di⁄erences I obtain a simple expression that compares the change in biased trade
costs to the change in true trade costs:





Equation (18) shows that the di⁄erence between the change in biased trade costs and the
change in true trade costs, ￿ln(1 + b ￿ij) ￿ ￿ln(1 + ￿ij), equals the di⁄erence between
the change in the misspeci￿ed multilateral resistance terms and the change in the correct





I use equation (18) to examine the e⁄ect of misspecifying the multilateral resistance





The implication of this misspeci￿cation is that if the actual multilateral resistance terms
follow a secular trend, then the resulting estimated trend of bilateral trade costs will be
biased. Figure 2 illustrates this point. The left-hand side panels plot the correct ￿i for the
U.S., Canada and Korea for the period 1970-2000 as computed on the basis of equation
(15).22 The right-hand side panels plot the true trade costs based on the correct time-
varying multilateral resistance variables (solid lines) as well as the biased trade costs based
on the misspeci￿ed, time-invariant multilateral resistance terms (dashed lines).23
As the top part of Figure 2 shows, both the U.S. and the Canadian ￿￿ s prove to be fairly
stable over time.24 This means that for those two countries multilateral resistance ￿iPi
and domestic trade costs tii changed at roughly equal pace. As a result, there is hardly a
di⁄erence between the correct and incorrect trade costs series in the right-hand side panel.
In contrast, as the bottom part of Figure 2 shows, Korean multilateral resistance
declined markedly over time relative to domestic trade costs. The biased U.S.-Korean
trade cost series thus fails to re￿ ect the full actual decline.25 In fact, the biased series
only reports a small decline in trade costs from 107 to 98 percent between 1970 and 2000
(dashed line), whereas actual trade costs declined from 107 to 70 percent (solid line, also see
21A special case of this misspeci￿cation is to ignore the multilateral resistance terms altogether, that is,
b ￿i = b ￿j = 1.
22Annual world income yW is constructed as the combined production data of Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK
and the U.S.
23In this example the multilateral resistance terms are held constant at their 1970 levels. But this is
merely a normalization and does not a⁄ect the argument.
24￿i represents multilateral resistance relative to domestic trade costs (i.e. tii ￿ 1), whereas Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004, Table 8) normalize trade costs within Maryland to zero (i.e. tii = 1) and report
multilateral resistance relative to this trade barrier within Maryland. They therefore obtain multilateral
resistance terms for U.S. states and Canadian provinces that are higher than those reported for the U.S.
and Canada in Figure 2.
25As ￿ln(￿i￿j) < 0, it follows from equation (18) that ￿ln(1 + b ￿ij) > ￿ln(1 + ￿ij). That is, the
decline in b ￿ij is not as strong as the decline in ￿ij.


























































































































Figure 2: Multilateral resistance variables and U.S. bilateral trade costs based on correct
time-varying and incorrect time-invariant multilateral resistance variables.
Table 1). Ignoring the fact that Korean multilateral resistance dropped over time relative
to domestic trade costs therefore leads to a miscalculation of the time trend by almost 30
percentage points.
Korea serves as a clear example of a country that has experienced a striking drop in
general trade costs and hence a striking drop in its multilateral resistance. The failure to
capture the downward trend in multilateral resistance by misspecifying it as a constant
results in the failure to capture the downward trend in bilateral trade costs. The intuition
rests on the crucial insight of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity framework that
bilateral trade ￿ ows are determined by bilateral relative to multilateral trade barriers. If one
underestimates the trend of a country￿ s multilateral barriers, one will also underestimate
the trend of its bilateral barriers.
Which is the most likely direction of the bias in practice? Of course, the decrease in
multilateral resistance might not be quite as strong for other countries as it is for Korea.
17But as long as there is a secular decrease in multilateral resistance, the bias will go in the
direction of underestimating the decline in bilateral trade costs.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the extent of the bias is not uniform across country pairs. In
gravity applications with panel data the bias can therefore generally not be avoided by using
time dummies. Instead, it is important to use time-varying ￿xed e⁄ects at the country or
country pair level. In a similar vein, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) argue for the use of time-
varying country ￿xed e⁄ects to control for the fact that multilateral resistance changes over
time.26
5 Discussion
The elasticity of substitution ￿ is a crucial parameter in the gravity literature. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) show that estimates of trade cost levels are quite sensitive to
the value of ￿. The same is of course true for the trade cost levels reported in Table 1.
However, it turns out that the changes of trade costs over time are hardly a⁄ected by the
elasticity of substitution. In fact, the decomposition of the growth of trade in Table 2 is
not a⁄ected by the value of ￿ at all.
The trade cost levels reported in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 are based on ￿ = 8,
which is in the middle of the common empirical range of 5 to 10 for the elasticity of
substitution, as surveyed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). For ￿ = 8 the trade-
weighted average of U.S. bilateral trade costs in Table 1 falls from 74 to 42 percent, a
decline of 44 percent. Equation (9) implies that a higher value of ￿ would lead to lower
trade cost levels. Intuitively, a higher elasticity of substitution means that goods are less
di⁄erentiated and consumers more price-sensitive. The more price-sensitive consumers
are, the fewer foreign goods they would buy for a given di⁄erence between bilateral and
domestic trade costs. In order to match the given empirical trade ￿ ows, a higher elasticity
of substitution implies that the di⁄erence between bilateral and domestic trade costs must
be relatively small, that is, ￿ij must be relatively low. But although the elasticity of
substitution a⁄ects the level of ￿ij, it hardly a⁄ects the change of ￿ij over time. For
example, in the case of ￿ = 10 the trade-weighted average falls from 54 to 31 percent, a
similar decline of 42 percent. In the case of ￿ = 5 the trade-weighted average falls from
167 to 87 percent, a decline of 48 percent.
It might be the case that the elasticity of substitution has systematically changed over
time. Following the approach of Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate
elasticities of substitution based on demand and supply relationships for disaggregated U.S.
26Also see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 732).
18imports. When comparing the period 1972-1988 with 1990-2001, they ￿nd that the median
elasticity fell marginally. But the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant for all levels of disaggregation
and it is unclear whether there has been a signi￿cant change in the elasticity at the aggregate
level. If it were the case that the aggregate elasticity fell over time, this would suggest that
trade costs would have declined less quickly than indicated in Table 1. But quantitatively,
this e⁄ect would seem unlikely to be large.27
The trade cost measure in equation (9) is a comprehensive measure that captures a
wide range of trade cost components such as transportation costs and tari⁄s, but also
components that are not directly observable such as the costs associated with language
barriers and red tape. It should therefore be regarded as an upper bound that captures
all trade cost elements that make international trade more costly over and above domestic
trade. Instead, direct measures of speci￿c trade cost components can be seen as a lower
bound of trade costs, for example international transportation costs reported by Hummels
(2007).
The trade costs are computed on the basis of the model￿ s general equilibrium solution for
trade costs. The advantage of this method is that it directly relates trade costs to observable
trade data. This obviates the need to impose speci￿c trade cost functions that are implicit
in standard gravity applications. Imposed trade cost functions can be problematic in that
they heavily rely on time-invariant trade cost proxies such as distance and might omit
important trade cost components. The advantage of avoiding arbitrary trade cost functions
comes at the cost of a lack of stochastic elements. But a stochastic estimation framework
could be easily implemented in a second stage by relating the computed trade costs to
common trade cost proxies such as bilateral distance, tari⁄s, exchange rate volatility etc.
This is the approach taken by Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2008). We show that such trade
cost proxies are sensibly related to the trade cost measure derived in equation (9).
Lastly, the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model, which forms the basis of the trade
cost measure, is in many respects a very simple model. It rests on the Armington assump-
tion that each country is endowed with a single di⁄erentiated aggregate good. Trade is
driven by consumers￿love of variety, leading to the core gravity equation. While the grav-
ity model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is arguably one of the most parsimonious
trade models of recent years, it is by no means the only one that leads to a gravity equation
with trade costs. In fact, my approach of solving the gravity model for the implied trade
costs is valid more generally, as isomorphic trade cost measures can be derived from other
leading trade models. Chen and Novy (2008) show that a measure akin to ￿ij in equation
(9) can be derived from the Ricardian trade model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), from
27According to Broda and Weinstein (2006, Table IV) the median elasticity fell from 3:7 to 3:1 at the
7-digit level, from 2:8 to 2:7 at the 5-digit level and from 2:5 to 2:2 at the 3-digit level.
19Chaney￿ s (2008) extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous ￿rms model to asymmetric
countries as well as from the heterogeneous ￿rms model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
with a non-CES linear demand system and endogenous markups. As Chen and Novy (2008)
discuss, the reason why an isomorphic measure can be derived from such a broad range of
theories is related to the fact that they all lead to gravity equations that have a similar
structure as equation (6).28
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a measure of international trade costs that varies across country pairs
and over time. The measure is micro-founded and based on the gravity framework by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In particular, I derive an analytical solution for mul-
tilateral resistance variables that depends on intranational trade ￿ ows. This solution is
useful because it relates the unobservable multilateral trade barriers to observable trade
data. Given this expression for time-varying multilateral resistance variables, I analytically
solve the model￿ s gravity equation for the micro-founded bilateral trade cost measure. This
trade cost measure is a function of observable trade data and can therefore be implemented
easily with time series and panel data to track the changes of trade costs over time. This
approach obviates the need to impose speci￿c trade cost functions that rely on trade cost
proxies such as distance.
As an illustration I compute U.S. bilateral trade costs for a number of major trading
partners. I ￿nd that the trade-weighted average of these trade costs declined by about
40 percent between 1970 and 2000. The decline of U.S. trade costs has been particularly
strong with its neighbors Mexico and Canada. I also decompose the growth of U.S. bilateral
trade and ￿nd that income growth is the single most important driving factor, followed by
declines in bilateral trade costs. On the contrary, declines in multilateral resistance slow
down the growth of bilateral trade by diverting trade to other countries.
28As many authors have pointed out, gravity equations are consistent with various competing trade
models (Deardor⁄, 1998; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 2001; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Feenstra, 2004).
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